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Chapter Five 
Disciplining Students in the United 
States 
An Ongoing Challenge 
Charles J. Russo 
As reflected by the legal issues reviewed in the chapters in this volume, a 
continuing concern in the United States 1 and nations around the world is how 
to maintain safe and orderly learning environments for children and other 
members of educational commlmities while safeguarding the legal rights of 
students who are accused of violating disciplinary rules. Considering the 
explosion of litigation in the area of student rights over the better part of the 
last half century in the United States,2 this chapter takes a focused approach 
to discipline in American public schools. 3 
In examining the status of student discipline in American public schools, 
an ongoing challenge for educators to be sure, this chapter is divided into 
four primary sections. The first part of the chapter provides an overview of 
the American legal system as the context in which disputes are resolved. 
Insofar as there is so much litigation on point, the second section of the 
chapter begins by focusing on student discipline generally before reviewing 
out of school conduct, zero tolerance policies, punishments (including corpo-
ral punishment as well as suspensions and expulsions), and due process 
hearings. The third part of the chapter briefly reviews the expansive and 
complicated topics of discip lining children with disabilities. 4 
Since they are overly expansive topics, this chapter does not deal with the 
voluminous litigation involving searches and seizures 5 or sexual harassment 6 
even in recognizing that these issues typically involve student discipline and 
due process concerns; neither does this chapter deal with the free speech 
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rights of students. 7 The fourth part of the chapter briefly addresses emerging 
issues in student discipline. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion. 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
The U.S. Constitution is the law of the land. In other words, the Constitution 
provides the framework within which the entire American legal system oper-
ates. Accordingly, actions of federal, state, and local governments including 
state constitutions, statutes, regulations, and common law, all of which inl-
pact the law of education as it pertains to disciplining students, are subject to 
the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court and lower courts. 
As important as education is, it is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. 
Under the Tenth Amendment, according to which "[tJhe powers not delegat-
ed to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people," then, education is 
primarily the concern of individual states. 
Federal courts can intervene in educational disputes if a federal right is at 
issue such as in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown).8 In Brown, the 
Supreme Court struck down state-sanctioned racial segregation in public 
schools on the basis that officials violated students' rights to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on the right to education per se. 
Along with identifying the rights of Americans, the Constitution estab-
lishes three coequal branches of government, all of which are involved in 
safeguarding the rights of students. The legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of government give rise to the three other sources of law. The 
legislative branch "makes the law." Once bills complete the legislative pro-
cess, they are signed into law by a chief executive such as a president or 
governor who has the power to enforce them through regulations written by 
personnel at administrative agencies. 
The fourth and final source of law is judge-made or common law. Com-
mon law requires judges to "interpret the law,"9 examining issues that may 
have been overlooked in the legislative or regulatory process or that may not 
have been anticipated when statutes were enacted. Common law involves the 
concept of precedent, the notion that a majority ruling of the highest court in 
a given jurisdiction is binding on lower courts within its jurisdiction. A ruling 
of the U.S . Supreme Court is thus binding throughout the nation, while 
decisions of state supreme court are binding only in given jurisdictions. 
The federal judiciary and most state court systems consist of three levels: 
trial courts, intermediate appellate courts, and courts of last resort. In the 
federal system, trial courts are known as federal district courts; state trial 
courts use a variety of names. Each state has at least one federal district court 
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while densely populated states, such as California and New York, have as 
many as four. 
Trial courts typically involve a judge and a jury. The role of the judge, as 
trier of law, is to apply the law by deciding, for instance, whether evidence is 
admissible while providing direction for juries on how to apply the law to the 
facts of the specific cases that they are examining. There are thirteen federal 
intermediate appellate courts known as Circuit Courts of Appeal; state inter-
mediate appellate courts employ a variety of names. The highest court in the 
United States is the Supreme Court; although most states refer to their high 
courts as supreme courts, a variety of titles are in use. 
DISCIPLINE GENERALLY 
Recognizing the increasingly difficult challenge facing educational officials, 
courts grant them "wide discretion in school discipline matters" 10 to ensure 
safe and orderly learning environments by adopting reasonable policies and 
procedures regulating student conduct. Of course, whether rules are enforce-
able depends on fact-specific analysis of disputes during litigation. 
Whether all rules are written is often inconsequential where offenses such 
as not turning in homework assignments, cheating, and talking either during 
class or out of turn are punishable under general expectations in schools. 
Insofar as courts concede that educators cannot develop written rules for all 
possible student rule violations, they typically defer to the authority of educa-
tors as long as they impose discipline that meets the requirements of due 
process. 
When students know, II or reasonably ought to know, school rules and the 
punishments applied by educators are appropriate to their offenses, 12 such as 
getting a zero for cheating on an examination, regardless of whether misbe-
havior occurs in schools or away from schools, courts are unlikely to inter-
fere as long as officials treat similarly situated individuals similarly by pro-
viding them with the required level of due process. 13 While students certainly 
have a right to know what conduct is prohibited, school rules need not meet 
the same standard that courts apply in criminal cases which calls for a higher 
burden of proof in establishing guilt or innocence. 14 
Out-of-School Conduct 
The authority of school officials to discipline students for their off-campus 
misconduct has led to a large amount of litigation with 1110St courts deferring 
to educators as long as rules satisfy due process. Clearly, educators can 
regulate student conduct that violates school rules even if it occurs at extra-
curricular activities such as football games. 15 It is, though, more difficult to 
enforce conduct rules outside of school due to potential conflicts with the 
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rights of parents and attenuated connections between student behavior and 
the educational process. As discussed briefly below as an emerging topic, 
courts reach mixed results in this emerging area of student use of the internet 
outside of schools such as in their own homes. 
Putting aside cases involving search and seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment to the u.s. Constitution and similar provisions in state constitutions, a 
topic beyond the scope of this chapter, courts typically refuse to intervene in 
disputes where rules prevent drug use and/or alcohol consumption. Courts 
tend to not get involved in these disputes regardless of whether infractions 
occur on campus, especially by student-athletes, but not exclusively limited 
to them, for two reasons. 
First, insofar it is well-settled that participating in extracurricular activ-
ities, whether such organizations as the National Honor Society 16 or sports, 17 
is a privilege rather than a right, educators can impose higher disciplinary 
standards on shldents who participate in these activities. Second, officials can 
base rules on health and safety concerns. In either circwnstance, educators 
can suspend or dismiss students who violate team or activity rules regardless 
of whether parents approve of the behavior of their children. 
At the same time, rules cannot be too broad such as where one forbade 
student-athletes from being in cars where beer was being transported. 18 Yet, 
presence at events where alcohol is being consumed can provide the justifica-
tion for rendering student-athletes ineligible 19 as can drinking alcohol at 
school-sponsored events. 20 Moreover, rules must be applied equally to males 
and females 21 when officials dismiss players from teams. 
As to punishments, a federal trial court in Wisconsin reiterated the legal 
principle that educational officials must rely on sufficient evidence and fair 
processes when disciplining students.22 Courts agree that students can be 
punished for off-campus activities that threaten the health or safety of those 
in school such as off-campus misbehaviors as drug sales, 23 possession of 
tobacc0 24 or drugs,25 and committing aggravated assaults 26 on school spon-
sored trips. 
Zero-Tolerance Policies 
As a subset of issues surrounding misbehavior typically associated with stu-
dent substance abuse and violence, whether in or around schools, many 
boards adopted zero-tolerance policies in attempts to remedy, ifnot eliminate 
problems with regard to drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and weapons. Insofar as 
such policies tend to deny educators discretion in making decisions, courts 
have reached mixed results when they are challenged. When reviewing zero-
tolerance policies, usually courts look to ensure that school officials acted 
with discretion in disciplining students. 
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When applying zero-tolerance policies, courts reached mixed results as to 
students who possessed knives in schools. For example, when school offi-
cials in Terulessee discovered a hunting knife in the glove compartment of a 
student's car, but it did not belong to him, the Sixth Circuit ruled that his 
proposed expulsion for possession of a weapon, pursuant to a zero-tolerance 
policy under which students could have been disciplined for not knowingly 
possessing weapons, was invalid because it was not rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest. 27 
Conversely, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that educators could suspend a 
student who had a knife in his locker even though he took it from a suicidal 
schoolmate.28 The court was satisfied that officials provided the student with 
due process before he was suspended. 
In Florida, an appellate court refused to intervene on behalf of a student 
who was suspended for bringing a gun to school under a zero-tolerance 
policy. 29 The court dismissed the claim insofar as it lacked jurisdiction under 
state law. Earlier, the federal trial court in South Dakota upheld a student's 
being disciplined for violating her school's zero-tolerance policy by using 
profanity. 30 
PUNISHMENTS 
Generally 
As discussed earlier, courts realize that educators need to use their discretion 
when disciplining students who break school rules. 31 If disciplinary rules and 
procedures satisfy due process as fundamentally fair, courts usually uphold 
the actions of educators as long as they are not arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable. 
Many of the cases discussed in this chapter demonstrate that courts have 
long taken the sex, age, and size as well as the mental, emotional, and 
physical conditions of students and the nature of their offenses into consider-
ation when reviewing penalties. 32 For instance, when a student received a 
ten-day suspension for using inappropriate and disrespectful language to edu-
cators, a federal trial court in Michigan rejected his claim that they violated 
his rights to due process because he missed his graduation ceremony and 
other senior events. 33 The court reasoned that insofar as the student received 
all of the process he was due and the punishment was rationally related to his 
offense, his claim was without merit. 
As noted, courts ordinarily do not review student conduct rules with the 
same scrutiny as they use in criminal cases. In Wood v. Strickland, involving 
the attempted expulsion of students in Arkansas for consuming alcoholic 
beverages at school or school-sponsored activities, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged as much. The court pointed out that the federal judiciary is not 
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supposed to "supplant the interpretation of [a] regulation of those officers 
who adopted it and are entrusted with its enforcement. "34 
Among the many cases dealing with punishments, courts refused to over-
turn such penalties as receiving a grade of zero for the first offense of pla-
giarism on an assignment; 35 being expelled for bringing a weapon to 
school; 36 being named a ward of the court for bringing a knife to school; 37 
being dismissed from a marching band for missing a perfonnance; 38 being 
seated at an isolated desk due to disruptive behavior; 39 and being suspended 
for turning in an assignment which expressed the desire to blow up the 
school. 40 Moreover, courts have upheld adjudications of juvenile delinquen-
cy against students for making obscene remarks to a teacher; 41 threatening a 
teacher; 42 being disruptive at school; 43 bringing a plastic toy gun to school;4', 
making a false fire alann report at school; 45 violating a law against the 
possession of a weapon at school by bringing a paintball glill and markers to 
school;46 and threatening to blow a counselor's brains out with a shotgun.47 
Other courts invalidated a variety of sanctions as too harsh. Courts over-
turned such penalties as a conviction for disorderly conduct where a student 
tIU'eatened to shoot up a school since no one took him seriously and there 
were no weapons in his home; 48 assault for throwing a partially eaten apple 
at a teacher; 49 adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for having a butter knife 
in a locker since it was incapable of being used as a deadly weapon; 50 and 
repeatedly using inSUlting and vulgar language to address a teacher. 51 
Corporal Punishment 
According to the common law, teachers have the right to administer reason-
able corporal punishment. In fact, absent growing statutory prohibitions 
against corporal punishment 52 rendering it illegal in more than half of the 
states, educators may employ the practice even against parental wishes 53 as 
long as local board policies authorize its use. 54 
Unless they are contrary to state law, local board policies with regard to 
the imposition of corporal punishment are genera lly controlling. 55 The use of 
unreasonable corporal punislunent, a determination that is ultimately a ques-
tion of fact for a jury to resolve, or behavior violating board policy or state 
law has served as the cause for dismissing teachers. 56 
In its only case on the merits of the practice, Ingraham v. Wright,57 the 
Supreme Court refused to treat corporal punishment as unconstitutional in all 
circumstances. It ruled that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishments was designed to protect those guilty of crimes 
and was inapplicable to paddling students in order to preserve discipline, not 
protect children. Noting that most jurisdictions at that time permitted its use, 
and that professional and public opinion was divided on the practice, the 
court refused to strike down corporal punishment as unconstitutional. 
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Turning to fact-specific cases, the Fourth,58 Tenth, 59 and Eleventh 60 Cir-
cuits, as well as federal trial courts,61 agreed that students can proceed with 
substantive due process claims where punishments are "so brutal , demean-
ing, and hannful as literally to shock the conscience of a court."62 In such a 
case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of a wrestling coach's claim for 
qualified immunity where a student sued him and other school officials after 
the coach encouraged members of his team to beat the plaintiff repeatedly. 63 
In two other cases, though, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, explaining that 
state statutory and common law provisions offered better redress as to dam-
ages and possible criminal liability rather than vitiate the use of corporal 
punishment. 64 Most litigation involving corporal punishment has been re-
solved in favor of teachers based on the presumption of correctness which 
complaining students and parents were unable to overcome. 65 
Suspension and Expulsion 
Suspension and expulsion are the most serious penalties that school officials 
can impose on students. Suspensions generally refer to temporary exclusions 
for set periods or until students satisfy specific conditions while expulsions 
are pennanent removals from school. On a related point, whether students are 
entitled to educational services during expulsions varies from one jurisdic-
tion to the next. The elements of due process depend to a significant extent 
on the length of the exclusions w1der consideration. 
Due Process and Punishments 
Courts generally defer to educators who use reasonable forms of discip line 
and can justify their actions. 66 Cases often hinge on whether officials pro-
vided students with adequate procedural due process. While due process does 
not require educators to afford students all of the safeguards present in crimi-
nal,67 or, for that matter, civil,68 proceedings, essential elements depend on 
the circwnstances and seriousness of potential punishments. At the very 
least, students who are subject to significant disciplinary penalties are enti-
tled to notice and opportunities to respond in the presence of fair and impar-
tial third-party decision makers. 69 
The Fifth Circuit provided the earliest guidelines, admittedly from a dis-
pute in higher education, as to required notice and hearings prior to long-term 
exclusions where a student faced expulsion from a public college for non-
academic reasons. 70 The court reasoned that notice should contain a state-
ment of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify an 
expulsion. The court also decided that insofar as assessing misconduct de-
pends on gathering facts that can be easily colored by witnesses, a fair and 
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impartial third-party decision maker must hear both sides in considerable 
detail. 
Expressly rejecting the requirement of "a full-dress judicial hearing, with 
the right to cross-examine witnesses,"7 1 the Fifth Circuit observed that "the 
rudiments of an adversary proceeding .. . [require that] .. . student[s] should 
be given the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written report 
on the facts to which each witness testifies. [They] should also be given the 
opportunity to present . .. [their] own defense against the charges and to 
produce either oral testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in [their] 
behalf." 72 
In Goss v. Lopez (GoSS),73 arguably the high water mark of student rights, 
the Supreme Court set out the minimum constitutional requirements when 
dealing with suspensions of ten days or less. In a dispute from Ohio, students 
who did not receive a hearing challenged their suspensions for allegedly 
disruptive conduct. 
Ruling in favor of the students, the Goss Supreme Court mandated that 
due process requires that they be given "oral or written notice of the charges 
against [them] and, if [they] den[y] them, an explanation of the evidence the 
authorities have and an opportunity to present [their] side of the story."74 The 
court held that there is no need for a delay between when officials give 
students notice and the time of their hearings, conceding that in most cases 
disciplinarians may well have informally discussed alleged acts of miscon-
duct with them shortly after they occurred. 75 
The Goss court pointed out that if the presence of students constitutes 
threats of disruption, they may be removed immediately with the due process 
requirements to be fulfilled as soon as practicable. The court expressly re-
jected the notion that students should be represented by counsel, be able to 
present witnesses, and be able to confront and cross-examine witnesses when 
facing short-term exclusions. 76 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court added that "[l]onger suspensions or 
expulsions for the remainder ofthe school term, or permanently, may require 
more formal procedures ... [and that] in unusual situations, although involv-
ing only a short suspension, something more than the rudimentary proce-
dures will be required."77 States have followed the court's suggestion by 
developing statutory guidelines when students are subject to long-tenn sus-
pensions or expUlsions. 
Following Goss, federal trial courts began to apply its procedural require-
ments to student disciplinary transfers 78 and three-day suspensions. 79 The 
courts agreed that where the property interests of students were involved, 
they were of sufficient magnitude to qualify for the minimal constitutional 
due process protections. A federal trial court in Texas reached the same result 
where a student received a three-day suspension for taking allegedly compro-
mising photographs of the principal's car while it was parked in front of a 
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female teacher's house.8o The Fifth Circuit later upheld a student's suspen-
sion for less than ten days, agreeing that officials did not violate his rights to 
due process in light of his role in an attack on his school's computer net-
work. 81 
In cases involving criminal misconduct, the Fifth 82 and Eleventh 83 Cir-
cuits was satisfied that insofar as students who were transferred to alternative 
schools within their districts did not suffer the losses of property interests, 
they lacked rights to hearings. On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit remanded 
a dispute where a student was transfelTed due to criminal misbehavior for 
consideration of whether the failure of officials to afford him a hearing 
violated his rights to due process. 84 
The argument that more extensive processes are necessary if disciplinary 
penalties indirectly lead to academic sanctions has led to mixed judicial 
results. The Seventh Circuit refused to intervene where a student's three-day 
suspension for drinking alcohol in violation of school rules delayed his grad-
uation. 85 
Courts disagree as to the precise requirements of procedural due process 
in connection with penalties that are more severe than the ten-day suspension 
involved in Goss. The bottom line is that educators must act with fairness. As 
such, most jurisdictions rely on the Supreme Court's perspective as set forth 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, that "[ d]ue process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands." 86 
In such a case, where a student in Georgia was suspended for nine days 
for fighting, screaming obscenities, and refusing to cooperate with and as-
saulting faculty members in connection with her possession of look-alike 
drugs at school, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that educators met the require-
ments of due process when her mother participated in a telephone call with 
them on the day that the incident occurred. 87 
Due Process Hearings 
Courts do not expect students who are accused of school disciplinary infrac-
tions to receive full judicial proceedings.88 Even so, courts agree that stu-
dents facing expulsions are entitled to notice informing them of the time and 
place of some form of hearings. 89 At the same time, school officials should 
inform students of the charges and the nature of the evidence that they face 90 
but not necessarily to prehearing notice of particular infractions. 
In representative litigation, courts upheld expulsions where one student 
and his parents received repeated warnings that he faced expulsion for pos-
session ofmarijuana91 and another was arrested and charged with two counts 
of illegal sales of controlled substances. 92 Both courts agreed that the stu-
dents were expelled after hearings that were presided over by fair and impar-
94 Chapler5 
tial third-party decision makers who based their actions on the contents ofthe 
records. 93 
Other courts decided that students are not entitled to have their own 
attorneys present as trial counsel 94 or at public expense if they can obtain pro 
bono lawyers,95 or to know the identity 0[96 and/or to confront witnesses, 97 
especially if there may be clear and serious danger to student witnesses. 98 
A dispute arose where a state statute afforded students and their parents 
due process rights including notice, an opportunity to respond, the right to be 
represented by counsel, as well as to present evidence and question witnesses 
during their expulsion proceedings. When the student and his parents chose 
neither to have an attorney present during his initial hearing nor to exercise 
his statutory right to present evidence or question witnesses, the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina rejected their claim that officials violated his rights 
to procedural due process. 99 
As reflected by a case from the Sixth Circuit, there is a balance between 
the rights of students who are accused of wrongdoing to confront witnesses 
and the danger to accusers. The court conceded that the necessity of protect-
ing student witnesses from reprisal and ostracism generally outweighs the 
value to the truth-seeking process of allowing them to cross-examine their 
accusers. 100 In addition, hearsay evidence used in hearings has withstood 
judicial scrutiny when allowing police or school officials to testifY instead of 
protected student witnesses. 101 
Other courts agreed that students lack rights to hearing officers who are 
not school employees 102 or, as noted, to Miranda warnings when questioned 
by educational officials. Conversely, "although '[a]s a general matter, there 
is no hard and fast federal Constitutional right to call or cross-examine wit-
nesses in a school disciplinary setting,"'103 some courts granted students the 
right to cross-examine witnesses; 104 to have an attorney present; 105 to the 
presence of an impartial, non-school , third-party decision maker; I 06 and to 
obtain a redacted copy of disciplinary records. 107 
In a case addressing aspects of due process, the Eighth Circuit affirmed 
that a middle school student in Arkansas failed to prove that educators violat-
ed his procedural due process rights when he was expelled as a result of an 
altercation with a teacher and principal. The court found that officials did not 
violate the student's rights because they fully informed his mother of the 
grounds for his expulsion and he received a hearing at which he was repre-
sented by counsel who had a full opportunity to examine and cross-examine 
witnesses. 108 The court pointed out that even though educators violated board 
rules by not supplying the student's attorney with the remarks of two wit-
nesses in advance of the hearing, this was not a constitutional violation. 109 
According to an older ~ederal. case from III~nois, students facing long-
term suspensions or expulSIOns dId not have a rIght to stenographic or me-
chanical recordings of proceedings. 110 Almost thirty years later, another ap-
Disciplining Students inlhe United Slates 95 
t· Illinois denied a student's request for a verbatim transcript of 
pellate cour 10 . III 
. ulsion heanng. . 
hIs e~p . I the federal trial court In Massachusetts agreed that a student 
Snn!lar y'luded from school for disruptive behavior was not entitled to a 
who was ~~ or mechanical recording of his expulsion hearing. 112 However, 
stenograp ty years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts af-
almost twen hen students ask that testimony given at closed hearings be 
fIrmed that w . b h d 113 d I tronically, It must e onore . 
recorde e eC s to disciplinary actions often involve disputes over whether 
Chall;;g.e Is fully complied with statutory provisions or board policies. If 
school. 0 ICI~ minor and officials have not violated student rights, courts 
. fr ctJOns al e . . 
m a erturn the punishments. For mstance, where a student dId not d not to ov . d ten . ecessary written notice, but knew of the rules an charges, the 
receIve th~ nurt ofYermont refused to invalidate his expulsion. 114 
Suprem~ 0 here a student in Mississippi admitted that he brought a switch-
Earher, h
W 
01 in violation of board policy, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that it 
blade to sc ~ary for all witnesses and their testimony to have been identified 
was u~~:~earing. 115 Additionally, although officials in Minnesota m~y not 
before . d d a precise rationale for a contemplated three-day suspensIOn of 
have proVI h~ distributed an unofficial newspaper in school containing vul-
stu~ents ~ the evidence against them was so overwhelming that a second 
gartty, bu Id not have altered the outcome, the Eighth Circuit acknowl-
hearing wOl~ficials did not violate their rights to due process. 116 
edged that 0 
DISCIPLINING STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 
. multiple earlier cases in a variety of jurisdictions, Honig v. Doe FoIl0~1~~ remains the Supreme Court's only case involving disciplining 
(Honzg) with disabilities. In a dispute over whether educators in California 
students lude two students with disabilities from school, the Justices af-
could d e~~t the stay-put provision in th~ Individuals wi~h Disabilities ~du~a­
fIone 118 prohibits educators from ul11laterally excludmg students wIth dls-tio~.~ct from school for dangerous or disruptive actions that are manifesta-
~blhtl;:their disabilities during the pendency of review proceedings. 
t1On5 Bonig, the Supreme Court added that officials could impose normal, 
In 1 ement-changing procedures such as, "the use of study carrels, time-
non-P d~~ention, or the restriction of privileges," 119 includi~g tem~orary sus-
outs,. for up to ten school days, for students who posed unmedlate threats 
ens IonS 
p hool safety. . 
to SC fi rtUTIately, Honig faded to resolve all of the legal issues surrounding 
lJn d~cators can discipline students with disabilities. Consequently, Con-
hoWe ught to clarify the rights of students with disabilities as part of the 
greSS SO 
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IDEA's 1997 Amendments. 120 These changes granted educators the author-
ity to suspend special education students for not more than ten school days as 
long as the same kinds of sanctions apply to children who are not disabled. 121 
According to the IDEA's regulations, a series of removals resulting in a 
pattern of exclusions cumulatively having children with disabilities out of 
school for more than ten school days may be considered changes in place-
ments. 122 The regulations make it clear that if students are suspended for 
misbehavior substantially similar to past actions that have been identified as 
manifestations of their disabilities, then this constitutes changes in place-
ments. 123 In making such judgments, the regulations direct educators to con-
sider the length of each removal, the total amount of time that children have 
been out of school, and the proximity of the removals to one another in 
evaluating whether changes in placements occurred. 124 
School officials can remove students with disabilities from school for 
separate, but dissimilar, acts of misconduct for more than ten cumulative 
days in school years. 125 After students with disabilities are removed from 
school for ten days in the same school year, during any later removals, 
educators must provide them with educational services. 126 
Under the 2004 amendments to the IDEA, educators have increased au-
thority when dealing with students with disabilities who possess weapons or 
drugs at school. 127 Pursuant to an expanded defmition of a dangerous weap-
on, the IDEA incorporates language from another federal statute such that it 
now includes instruments, devices, materials, and substances capable of in-
flicting harm in addition to firearms, but does not include small pocket 
knives. 128 
The IDEA defines illegal drugs as controlled substances but excludes 
those that may be legally prescribed by physicians. 129 Educators may thus 
transfer students with disabilities unilaterally to interim alternative place-
ments for up to forty-five school days for carrying or possessing weapons 130 
or for knowing possession, use, sale, or solicitation of drugs 131 on school 
property or at school functions as long as this sanction applies tmder like 
circumstances for peers who are not disabled. 132 
Another change in the 2004 version of the IDEA pennits educators to 
place students who inflicted serious bodily injury on others at school, on 
school premises, or at school functions in alternative educational settings. 133 
In explicating "serious bodily injury," the IDEA relies on another federal 
statute which defines the term as involving a substantial risk of death, ex-
treme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss 
or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental facul-
ty. 134 
Under the IDEA's interim alternative placement provisions, educators 
must allow students to continue to progress in general curricula where they 
still receive necessary services outlined in their IEPs. 135 Further, school offi-
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cials must provide students with services and modifications designed to pre-
vent the misbehaviors from recurring. 136 
When students are moved to alternative placements for more than ten 
school days, 137 educators must conduct functional behavioral assessments 
(FBAs) and implement behavioral intervention plans (BIPs) if they are not 
already in place. 138 If plans were in place when children misbehaved, IEP 
teams must review them and their implementation in order to make any 
necessary modifications. 139 If parents disagree with alternative placements 
and request hearings, consistent with the IDEA's stay-put provision, children 
must remain in their alternative settings. 140 On the expiration of the forty-five 
day periods, educators must return students to their former settings even if 
hearings on school board proposals to change their placements are pending 
unless parents and educators agree otherwise. 141 
Educators must complete FBAs and BIPs if they view disciplinary infrac-
tions as manifestations of students' disabilities. 142 As important as FBAs and 
BIPs can be, though, and as directive as the IDEA and its regu lations are, 
neither addresses their content or fonn. Moreover, there is little case law 
addressing this issue. 143 
The IDEA includes definitions and procedures to evaluate whether, on 
"case-by-case determinations," 144 misconduct is related to students' disabil-
ities. 145 The IDEA defines a manifestation as conduct caused by or having a 
direct and substantial relationship to students' disabilities or as the direct 
result of the failure of school officials to implement IEPs properly. In review-
ing whether placements are inappropriate, key members ofIEP teams shou ld 
gather and use the same standards they worked with in prospectively evaluat-
ing whether proposed placements were appropriate. 146 
If teams interpret misconduct as either manifestations of students' disabil-
ities or as results of improperly implemented IEPs, children may not be 
expelled or suspended for more than ten days and school officials must 
reconsider their current placements. 147 In rendering manifestation determina-
tions, teams must consider all relevant information, including evaluations 
and diagnostic results as well as student observations. 148 
As with other aspects related to special education, manifestation determi-
nations are subject to the IDEA' s administrative appeals process. The IDEA 
now directs school officials to expedite hearings incident to manifestation 
detenninations. Hearings must occlli' within twenty school days of the dates 
on which they were requested and hearing officers must render decisions 
within ten days of hearings. 149 
If parents contest the outcomes of manifestation determinations, educa-
tors must delay long-term suspensions or expulsions until hearings are com-
pleted while students may remain in interim alternative educational set-
tings. 150 Along with retaining students in their then current, or pendent, 
placements, hearing officers may issue change in placement orders. 151 
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Language in the revised IDEA addresses whether school officials can 
discontinue services for children who are properly expelled for misconduct 
that is not related to their disabilities. In codifYing a federal policy directing 
officials to provide services for a student who was excluded for misbehavior 
unrelated to his disability, the IDEA essentially repudiated earlier litigation 
which rejected the position that such a requirement existed. 152 
The IDEA requires boards to provide appropriate educational placements 
for all students with disabilities including those who have been expelled from 
school. 153 As a result, even if students are expelled for disciplinary infrac-
tions unrelated to their disabilities, they must be provided with services al-
lowing them to progress toward achieving their IEP goals. 154 
In resolving disputes over the status of students who were not yet as-
sessed for special education but claimed to have been covered by the IDEA 
officials must now provide the law's protections to individuals if they knew 
that children were disabled before they misbehaved. 155 Educators may be 
considered to be on notice in light of students' prior behavioral and academic 
perfonnances and the concerns of teachers about their perfonnances. 156 An 
exception exists if educators already conducted evaluations and concluded 
that students were not disabled or if parents refused to grant their pennission 
for evaluations or declined offered special education services. 157 
If parents request evaluations when students are subject to disciplinary 
sanctions, they must be conducted in an expedited manner. 158 Consistent 
with the IDEA's stay-put provision, until expedited evaluations are com-
pleted, students must remain in the placements deemed appropriate by educa-
tors. 159 If evaluation teams have reason to believe that children are disabled, 
they must provide students with special education services. 160 
The IDEA's discipline provisions allow school officials to report crimes 
committed by students to the proper authorities or impeding law enforcement 
and judicial authorities from carrying out their duties. 16 1 If officials report 
crimes, they must make copies of students' special education and discipli-
nary records avai lable to appropriate authorities. 162 
EMERGING ISSUES 
As in other parts of the world, courts and educational leaders have difficulty 
keeping pace with technological advancements particularly as they impact 
student expressive activities in and around schools. This interplay between 
student rights to free speech and the ability of educators to ensure safe and 
orderly learning environments, presents perhaps the greatest challenge for 
school officials in the United States as they who seek to look after the well-
being of all of the students in their care. 163 
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Coupled with the fact that many of the cases involving cyber-bullying, 
whether of peers 164 or teachers, 165 and that inappropriate websites were often 
created in private homes rather than schools raises novel questions about the 
authority of educators to intervene. These cases have led to seemingly para-
doxical outcomes as students 166 have prevailed in some litigation while 
school officials 167 have triumphed in other cases. It should be interesting to 
observe how this issue plays itself out in coming years. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, one of the greatest challenges facing educational leaders and teach-
ers is devising school rules that help to create safe and orderly learning 
envirolunents. By reviewing the litigation and issues described in this chap-
ter, hopefully educators can devise systems of discipline that respect the 
rights of all members of school communities. 
KEY POINTS 
1. Students have varying rights to due process when subjected to disci-
pline in American public schools. 
2. For minor infractions where students knew, or should have known the 
law, school officials can act w1ilaterallY as long as punishments are 
appropriate to the offenses. 
3. Students are entitled to due process hearings when they will be out of 
school for ten days or longer. 
4. Disciplining students with disabilities is a complex process. If the 
misbehavior is related to students' disabilities, educational officials 
must provide significant procedural due process if they are to be re-
moved from their current placements for ten days or more. 
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